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Perspective
F
ounded in the wake of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, 
the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was established in 1945 
when government representatives 
met and agreed on a “framework of 
international economic cooperation” 
(http://www.imf.org/external/
index.htm) designed to prevent 
future economic crises. Its mission 
was threefold: to ensure the stability 
of the exchange rate, to promote 
economic growth, and to provide 
financial assistance in the form of short-
term loans to countries experiencing 
balance-of-payments difficulties. When 
countries borrow from the Fund, they 
are required to agree to conditions 
set by the organization, a process that 
the IMF refers to as “conditionality.” 
These conditions entail the adoption 
of economic policies or “structural 
adjustment programs” that are meant 
to redress the problems that led to 
the need for the loan and therefore 
to enable prompt repayment. While 
the conditions vary for different loans, 
most impose some regimen of fiscal 
austerity through reduced government 
spending, removing barriers to 
international trade, cutting government 
subsidies, and privatization. 
IMF Conditionalities and Health
What kind of impact might IMF loans, 
and their conditionalities, have upon 
health outcomes? A new study in this 
issue of PLoS Medicine attempts to 
address this question by examining 
IMF programs and tuberculosis (TB) 
outcomes in post-communist countries 
[1].
Critics of the IMF charge that 
IMF conditionalities have helped 
undermine the health of some of the 
world’s most vulnerable populations. 
They argue that health outcomes suffer 
from reduced government spending 
on health care and on other inputs to 
health, such as food, as well as from 
the capping of public sector wages. 
IMF policies are also cited as having 
led to the diversion of foreign aid 
intended for health to the repayment 
of domestic debt. Such an outcome 
could serve as a strong disincentive 
for external funders to increase future 
health financing [2]. 
Other critics point to the indirect 
effects of macroeconomic changes 
that reduce income and increase 
prices. Rural poverty leads to urban 
migration and an attendant rise in 
prostitution, which may fuel the 
transmission of HIV, and rising 
urban poverty increases crime and 
incarceration, which in turn promotes 
the transmission of infectious diseases 
[3]. 
Gathering Evidence on the Health 
Impacts of IMF Loans
Given the often vituperative debate 
between the IMF and its critics about 
the health impacts of IMF loans, 
the need for evidence in support of 
charges and counter-charges becomes 
ever more apparent. But what kind of 
evidence would shed light on these 
health impacts? 
Much of the current debate focuses 
on the effect of conditionalities on 
health spending, rather than on specific 
health outcomes. A recent report from 
the Center for Global Development 
asks, “Does the IMF constrain health 
spending in poor countries?” [4]. 
Although the report found that 
broad trends in government health 
spending were similar in countries 
with and without IMF involvement, 
it also recognized that little could be 
inferred from the small differences 
found. Nonetheless, the authors 
noted that “the nature of many health 
interventions makes them especially 
sensitive to fiscal decisions...Because of 
the imperative of ensuring continuity in 
services and drug supply for HIV/AIDS 
[and] tuberculosis…any temporary 
interruptions in funding can have 
very serious consequences for health 
outcomes” [4]. These findings suggest 
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Linked Research Article
This Perspective discusses the following 
new study published in PLoS Medicine:
Stuckler D, King LP, Basu S (2008) 
International Monetary Fund programs 
and tuberculosis outcomes in post-
communist countries. PLoS Med 5(7): 
e143. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143
David Stuckler and colleagues show 
that, in Eastern European and former 
Soviet Union countries, participation in 
International Monetary Fund economic 
programs have been associated with 
higher mortality rates from tuberculosis.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1012 July 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 7  |  e162
the need to directly compare actual 
health outcomes in countries with and 
without the intervention.
Such measurements are 
complicated by a number of daunting 
methodological problems. IMF 
loans are not randomly assigned 
by an investigator, as are medical 
treatments in clinical studies. Instead, 
countries receive IMF loans because 
of pressing financial problems that 
may affect both short- and long-term 
health status, quite apart from the 
conditionality imposed by the IMF. 
If the indication for an intervention 
is itself associated with an outcome, 
the results of a study assessing that 
intervention may be biased, leading 
to what is termed “confounding 
by indication” in epidemiological 
studies. Furthermore, IMF loans and 
conditions come in different sizes and 
shapes, and the short-term outcomes 
of these programs often provoke mid-
course policy corrections that make 
it hard to detect consistent effects. 
Finally, the effect of broad reductions 
in health care may lag many years 
behind the actual intervention and 
may therefore be missed in an analysis 
that does not capture late events. 
And, although an observational study 
is of course necessary, a valid control 
group—such as countries that qualify 
for IMF loans but do not receive 
them—may not exist.
The New Study
In the new study, David Stuckler and 
colleagues delve into this difficult 
methodological terrain [1]. They 
provide new evidence linking IMF 
loans to the enormous increases 
in TB incidence, prevalence, and 
mortality that occurred in some 
former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries during the post-
communist period of the early to 
mid-1990s. After controlling for a 
host of variables, they find that IMF 
loans are associated with a 16.6% rise 
in annual TB mortality. This estimate 
did not change after adjusting for 
factors expected to mediate the 
impact of the loans, such as HIV 
prevalence, incarceration rates, and 
variables reflecting macroeconomic 
policy changes. Although IMF loans 
were associated with a fall in directly 
observed therapy (DOTS) population 
coverage levels, controlling for this 
variable had no effect on the strength 
of the association between loans and 
TB deaths. This result emphasizes the 
complex and confusing pathways by 
which macroeconomic policies lead to 
specific health effects.
Study Limitations 
The new study raises many important 
issues, particularly related to the policy 
implications of the conclusions. But are 
the study findings correct? Should we 
regard them as meeting the evidence-
based standards of the best clinical 
research? 
The study has at least five limitations. 
First, the IMF loans were not randomly 
assigned. In addition to this lack 
of randomization, the investigators 
included all of the Eastern European 
and former Soviet Union countries 
in their study, rather than comparing 
countries that received an IMF loan 
with, say, otherwise similar countries 
that just missed the threshold to 
qualify for a loan. Second, IMF loans 
are highly heterogeneous, and each 
type of loan may have massively 
different effects across countries and 
time periods. Third, the size of these 
loans is at best an imperfect proxy 
for conditionalities, and so the link 
to the extent of macroeconomic 
policy change that might have led to 
health changes is undocumented and 
likely variable. Fourth, the authors 
use special “robust standard errors”; 
however, if this approach makes a 
difference, it also indicates that an 
aspect of their model was misspecified, 
in which case we should probably have 
less confidence in the rest of their 
model, which was not similarly tested. 
Fifth, the similarity and dependence in 
their data measured over time means 
that they have many fewer independent 
pieces of information than the raw 
number of observations reported. 
Observational Studies Versus 
Randomized Trials
Although these limitations seem stark 
by the standards of a randomized 
clinical trial (RCT), we should not 
necessarily discount the study’s policy 
implications. If the assumptions 
underlying this work are correct, the 
authors are estimating a causal effect 
among all “subjects” (i.e., countries) 
and time periods of interest. In 
contrast, the patients included in RCTs 
are typically not representative of, 
and certainly not randomly selected 
from, the populations to which the 
treatment would be applied. This 
leaves us with a key question: is the 
potential for bias larger when random 
assignment to treatment is impossible, 
as in Stuckler and colleagues’ study 
and other observational studies, 
or when random selection of trial 
participants from the target population 
is impossible, as with most RCTs? 
Failure to either randomly assign or 
randomly treat can lead to biases of 
any size. As a result, one type of study 
should not be automatically favored 
over the other [5,6]. RCTs themselves 
are prone to many weaknesses, such as 
problems of compliance, missing data, 
measurement error, and post-treatment 
bias, all of which require modeling 
assumptions of their own and lead to 
substantial uncertainties of other kinds.
Moreover, many RCTs produce 
valuable scientific knowledge about a 
subset of potential patients, but do not 
speak to the effect of a public policy 
that might be constructed with this 
knowledge. Knowing the biological 
effect of a drug or risk factor is one 
thing; designing and evaluating a large-
scale public policy program involves 
a whole range of different issues [7]. 
One cannot infer the effects of a public 
policy on the basis of a drug trial or 
even solid biological knowledge of a 
problem; otherwise, we should now 
regard obesity, diabetes, alcoholism, 
and lung cancer as solved problems. 
Indeed, most large-scale public policy 
evaluations entail uncertainties of 
similar types and sizes as those that 
attend Stuckler and colleagues’ 
study. It is true that the conclusions 
of this observational study required 
many statistical assumptions, any one 
of which could lead to substantial 
inferential biases, and so the scientific 
status of the authors’ conclusions 
necessarily remains uncertain. But we 
are convinced that at least the authors 
went very far in testing assumptions 
and mitigating uncertainties, and so 
the study and its conclusions should be 
taken seriously.  
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